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Logic of Armageddon (2) - Game Theory

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Total Votes: 18

Figure 1

Figure 2

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In the 1983 cult classic movie Wargames, an experimental artificial intelligence named Joshua is given total control of the United States' nuclear arsenal. In the climactic scene, Joshua is asked to evaluate US nuclear strategy in order to determine the optimal path to a victory over the Soviet Union. His conclusion, that the only way to win is to not play the game, is a cinematic articulation of the conclusions of game theory, a branch of mathematics dealing with rational decision making. In game theory, a series of decisions are postulated, typically involving two or more players, and the expected outcome of the situation is arrived at by assessing the choices players will make in an attempt to maximize outcomes. Game theory has proved itself ideal for explaining the seemingly irrational choices that nuclear power make, such as the decision to engage in arms races, along side the supremely logical choices, such as the constant decision not to use those weapons.

The Normal Form

Game theory is a hugely advanced branch of mathematics which delves very deeply into the decision making process. Fortunately for the strategic thinker, military strategy between nations, particularly involving weapons of mass destruction, is easily represented in the table-style layout often referred to as the "Normal Form." The grid labeled "Figure 1" at right represents an example Normal Form game. The choices for Player 1 are represented as a row-choice (and are shown in blue) whereas the choices for Player 2 are represented as a column-choice (and are shown in red). In the intersecting cells, the expected payoffs for both Player 1 (blue) and Player 2 (red) are shown. Thus, we can see that if Player 1 chooses "cooperate" and Player 2 chooses "defect," Player 1 has an expected payout of 0 and Player 2 an expected payout of 3. Normal Form games like this one make the implicit assumption that all players have access to perfect information (meaning that they know the expected payouts in advance), but that no meaningful communication is possible between players outside of the decisions in the game – that is to say that they can not discuss their strategy.

The Prisoner's Dilemma

Figure 1 illustrates, not just how the Normal Form works, but also a situation called the Prisoners Dilemma. In this case, Player 1 and Player 2 are accomplices in a crime. They have each been arrested and each taken to separate interrogation rooms and may either cooperate (stick to their story and face the music) or defect (turn state's evidence in exchange for a lighter sentence). As the prisoners are unable to communicate with each other, each must decide if he trusts the other to stick to the story. Raw numbers make the Prisoners Dilemma a bit hard to grasp, so we'll assign some harder sounding language to them. Assume the following:

  • 0: Life In Prison
  • 1: 40 Years In Prison
  • 2: 5 Years in Prison
  • 3: Immediate Release

Looking at the choices available to the prisoners, we see that, from the point of view of Player 1 (blue) the most rational choice is to defect irrespective of what Player 2's choice is. This is a very powerful mathematical truth. It demonstrates that, by virtue of rational choice and a selfish desire to maximize expected outcome, neither Player 1 nor Player 2 will co-operate, which means that the optimal state of the game (Cooperate-Cooperate) and its optimal payout (2,2) will never be chosen. Rather, both players will choose to defect and will arrive at the (1,1) payout.

The Arms Race

This Prisoner's Dilemma scales perfectly to encompass the actions, not of prisoners but of nations. Rather than two prisoners in separate interrogation rooms we substitute two nations on either side of the world. Rather than the decision to stick to a story or turn State's evidence we substitute the choice between building schools or building nuclear weapons. Defecting (building bombs) becomes the rational choice for either power. Our nomenclature for our payouts has, of course, changed:

  • 0: Complete loss of security.
  • 1: Poor schools but safe (for now)
  • 2: Temporary security and great schools
  • 3: Perfect national security

Again, however, rational behavior seeking to selfishly maximize the expected outcome leads to the sub-optimal solution – the arms race.

The Nash Equilibrium

The set of choices upon which these games tend to settle is called the Nash Equilibrium. Proposed by John Forbes Nash, the equilibrium is the point "where no player has anything to gain by changing only his or her own strategy unilaterally." This is exactly the case with the Prisoner's Dilemma/Arms Race game, as neither side has reason to shift her action from "defect" to "cooperate" without a corresponding (and seemingly irrational) choice from the opponent. The Nash Equilibrium, however, elegantly explains the other side of super-power brinksmanship: peace through Mutually Assured Destruction. Or, to the more whimsical, the classic staple of 1950s greaser mythology: Chicken.

Chicken and Mutually Assured Destruction

The game of Chicken, first depicted in Rebel Without a Cause, pits two drivers in a battle of high-stakes wills. Drivers race towards certain death (a cliff face, or in later depictions, a head on collision with each other), achieving victory by being the last to flinch from death (by swerving or jumping from the car). Victory and defeat in the game are thus dwarfed by the larger implications of a negative stalemate: the certain death of both competitors. Figure 2 illustrates a game of Chicken. Unlike the Prisoner's Dilemma, the actual values involved have some significance in this game, so rather than use 0-3, the expected payouts have been weighted. Even so, to give some context, consider the following:

  • 0: No loss of face.
  • -1: Loss of status/argument
  • +1: Win of status/argument
  • -100: Death in a car crash

Chicken also serves as a theoretical model for Mutually Assured Destruction. Players, in this case nations, seek victory in the game, but not at the expense of the threatened catastrophic outcome. Communication between players takes place through the Three Cs of deterrence (more on this in Part 1 of this series), and the horrific possibility of nuclear annihilation leads one or both players to flinch in the face of total war.  

  • 0: Coordinated relaxation of tensions.
  • -1: Back down, possibly emboldening the enemy
  • +1: Force the enemy to back down, possibly weakening them
  • -100: Nuclear War

Key to understanding Chicken in the context of Mutually Assured Destruction is the recognition that this is not a choice between "launch" or "don't launch," but rather a decision between "continue towards war" or "back down." In the case of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis the choice for the US was between "blockade Cuba" and "let the Soviets keep their missiles," while the choice for Khrushchev was between "continue missile construction" and "withdraw from Cuba." The Chicken dynamic defined the crisis with the preferred solution for both parties representing the path to war. Chicken, and thus Mutually Assured Destruction, has two Nash Equilibriums, both involving one party "swerving." The closer the threat of Nuclear War, the more likely such a "swerve" is.

Conclusions

Game theory thus presents a logical and predictive explanation for the actions of nuclear nations. In the cold light of rationality, even the headlong rush towards war exhibited in the Arms Race and the razor thin edge of peace through Mutually Assured Destruction appear both logical and elegant solutions to the problem of the unimaginable power of the atom and the frightening rapidity of modern war. Despite the sense of security that comes with a mathematical proof of safety in a nuclear world, breakdowns do exist in the algebra of deterrence and dynamics can and will occur where the only rational choice is not peace, but war. These breakdowns in global stalemate of M.A.D. represent a real threat to global security, far more significant than the imagined Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction or even the phantoms of terrorism that lurk in the shadows of the global community and they are the subject of the third in this series, Destabilizing Dynamics.

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{"commentId":318158,"authorDomain":"killfile"}

Further questions on the topic are welcome. Destabilizing Dynamics will be the subject of the next in this series.

{"commentId":318158,"threadId":"46174","contentId":"382891","authorDomain":"killfile"}
  • 3 votes
Reply#1 - Thu Oct 5, 2006 9:48 PM EDT
{"commentId":318361,"authorDomain":"djehuty"}

It's a great resource for newsvine to have this sort of "backgrounder", Killfile. You've put together an extremely clear and illuminating piece, thanks!

{"commentId":318361,"threadId":"46174","contentId":"382891","authorDomain":"djehuty"}
  • 5 votes
Reply#2 - Fri Oct 6, 2006 12:37 AM EDT
{"commentId":318810,"authorDomain":"PamelaDrew"}

Killfile you are a gem. You continually enlighten, and inspire thought provoking examination and offer illumination. This is yet another beautiful example. Thank you so much for sharing it, and bringing viners into the loop on the game theory.

{"commentId":318810,"threadId":"46174","contentId":"382891","authorDomain":"PamelaDrew"}
  • 6 votes
#2.1 - Fri Oct 6, 2006 11:59 AM EDT
Reply
{"commentId":318404,"authorDomain":"ISPY"}

All my life I have believed that the was no reason or logical explanation for some of the weapons developed during the Cold War. (Such as fake Nukes) I now see the twisted logic beginning to unravel.

Thanx KF

{"commentId":318404,"threadId":"46174","contentId":"382891","authorDomain":"ISPY"}
  • 6 votes
Reply#3 - Fri Oct 6, 2006 2:19 AM EDT
{"commentId":318501,"authorDomain":"killfile"}

Actually false weapons present on of the problematic states for this. Normal Form games assume that both sides have what I called "Perfect Information." That doesn't mean they have perfect intelligence going into any given conflict or decision, but that they know what the payouts are going to be in each grid of the cell in advance.

The Soviet development of inflatable tank divisions during the Cold War, for example, serves to make the US think twice about a ground war against the USSR (because we didn't know they were inflatable tanks) but doesn't give the Soviets any real edge. It thus changes our expected payouts for war with the USSR but it doesn't change theirs. More over, it also changes what we expect their payouts to be.

That's where things get really complex, because the Soviet thinkers need to be worried about what the US will do if it falls for the ruse, what it will do if it doesn't and how it will be able to tell the difference.

{"commentId":318501,"threadId":"46174","contentId":"382891","authorDomain":"killfile"}
  • 9 votes
#3.1 - Fri Oct 6, 2006 7:53 AM EDT
Reply
{"commentId":319050,"authorDomain":"chill888"}

Enjoyed your article -- well done.

OK I read slowly twice

Comments/Questions:

1. 0: Coordinated relaxation of tensions??

Why a zero value? Perhaps this is the problem with the world. Shouldn't this have a huge value? eg. Israel and Arabs mutually agree to love each other. WOOOHOO

-- or probably I misunderstand .. sorry if so

2. My fear is one day with technological advances --- dozens and hundreds of groups will have the ability to destroy the planet. Versus a 2 player MAD scenario.

At this point, to hell with game theory, if the world hasn't learned to get along, we're toast.

3. Way off topic there is a brand new little downloadable computer game getting good reviews. Defcon. basically a fast paced world map, nuclear war game. Haven't tried it.

Link

{"commentId":319050,"threadId":"46174","contentId":"382891","authorDomain":"chill888"}
  • 2 votes
Reply#4 - Fri Oct 6, 2006 2:29 PM EDT
{"commentId":319082,"authorDomain":"killfile"}

Coordinated relaxation of tensions??

You're misinterpreting that a bit -- or maybe I wasn't clear with it. I don't mean Israel and Iran learning to love each other there. The Cuban Missile Crisis really had a 0,0 outcome. Both the US and the USSR gave something up to back away from the brink. Neither was really happy with the solution and neither really gained anything save the avoidance of war. It's still 100 points better than nuclear war... but it's not what either side wanted going in.

My fear is one day with technological advances --- dozens and hundreds of groups will have the ability to destroy the planet. Versus a 2 player MAD scenario.

And that's a fair fear. The caveat here is that game theory, MAD, and pretty much all strategic theory is grounded in the notion that only Nation-States get to play the game. As technology advances this is increasingly less true. We need to expand our understanding of state action - not just militarily - in order to keep pace with this sort of thing.

There will very likely come a day when nano-assembly and other techniques will make the personal production of a nuclear weapon a matter of time and energy. We are going to see acts of Nuclear Terrorism once this happens and probably before it. What we're unlikely to see, however, is global thermonuclear war because of it. Game theory will still hold out there and as much as the nuclear annihilation of Dallas would suck - the US won't be willing to launch of global nuclear war over it if there's nothing to gain from it.

When Timothy McVeigh bombed the Federal Building we didn't send a flight of B2s to bomb the Nichols ranch into smoking oblivion. A response in kind is only really necessary when dealing with a state actor.

{"commentId":319082,"threadId":"46174","contentId":"382891","authorDomain":"killfile"}
  • 5 votes
#4.1 - Fri Oct 6, 2006 2:46 PM EDT
Reply
{"commentId":319085,"authorDomain":"dehehn"}

The worst part is that since the Cold War "ended" in the 90's everyone thinks we don't have to worry about US and Russian nuclear buildups. But if the Cold War is over then why are we developing new nuclear weapons?

After 9/11 Bush pulled out of the ABM treaty with Russia allowing us to build Anti-Nuclear Missle defense systems giving us First Strike capabilities. Thus sending the message that the US is still very much involved in keeping the Nuclear arms race going, while giving us the ability to pre-emptively strike, which we now have a major precendent for doing. And it clearly destroys the mutually assured destruction deterent factor, since we wouldn't be mutually destroyed if we can defend ourselves from a nuclear attack.

And since we aren't working with Russia to make sure they have a stable state there is a constant threat of Russia collapsing and all of their Nuclear arms falling into the hands of revolutionarys, terrorists or who knows who. So as it is I think we're in an even more dangerous state than at the height of the Cold War we claim to have won.

{"commentId":319085,"threadId":"46174","contentId":"382891","authorDomain":"dehehn"}
  • 1 vote
Reply#5 - Fri Oct 6, 2006 2:47 PM EDT
{"commentId":319139,"authorDomain":"killfile"}

Deh -- you're really not talking about First Strike capability there. If you want to read my previous piece on Deterrence Theory I talk a little about First and Second strikes. Even so, you raise a worthwhile point which is that ABM systems are inherently destabilizing. I'll talk more about that in the next installment of this series

{"commentId":319139,"threadId":"46174","contentId":"382891","authorDomain":"killfile"}
    #5.1 - Fri Oct 6, 2006 3:13 PM EDT
    {"commentId":321355,"authorDomain":"dehehn"}

    If you can defend yourself from incoming missles then you would then have the ability to attack someone first and not have to worry about retalliation. To me that seems like enough to gain first strike capability, since all you have to worry about is the fact that you just destroyed a nation and the obvious world outrage to follow. But I'm far from an expert on the subject.

    I look forward to reading your thoughts in the next installment.

    {"commentId":321355,"threadId":"46174","contentId":"382891","authorDomain":"dehehn"}
      #5.2 - Sun Oct 8, 2006 9:38 PM EDT
      Reply
      {"commentId":319147,"authorDomain":"chill888"}

      You're misinterpreting that a bit -- or maybe I wasn't clear with it. I don't mean Israel and Iran learning to love each other there. The Cuban Missile Crisis really had a 0,0 outcome. Both the US and the USSR gave something up to back away from the brink. Neither was really happy with the solution and neither really gained anything save the avoidance of war. It's still 100 points better than nuclear war... but it's not what either side wanted going in.

      OK - but that's looking at it from a nation state point of view. the average citizen was a HUGE winner by the de-escalation of the violence. But I take your point.

      Sorry if I am not understanding, but perhaps this is the problem in a fractured world sorely lacking in enlightened leaders that act for the better-ment of all.

      I would see in a global game theory that all would be far better off with less fighting and more co-operation - the co-operation box in your chart. Almost certainly "THE PIE" would be far bigger, so "on average" everyone wins.

      But the small-me (the local official, or despot, or congressman) sees opportunities for personal gain that saps the bigger picture.

      So its less one against one versus the greater good versus the personal good.
      ------------------------------

      OK i understand guys have won Nobel prizes for this stuff and my comments are probably off-base ..... so apologies

      {"commentId":319147,"threadId":"46174","contentId":"382891","authorDomain":"chill888"}
      • 1 vote
      Reply#6 - Fri Oct 6, 2006 3:21 PM EDT
      {"commentId":319207,"authorDomain":"killfile"}

      A slow relaxation of tensions, however, isn't a long term solution - it's a short term one. The US and USSR weren't a great deal more friendly following Cuba, they'd just avoided war that once. Avoiding war isn't a net gain for either side -- you're no better off than you were the day before (though you're certainly better off than you would have been if you'd gone to war). Hence the 0 score.

      The prisoner's dilemma is a much better game to model the overall system of peace between great powers. Getting to the optimal solution requires trust, because there is so much to gain from stabbing your opponent in the back.

      As to the difference between the thinking of an individual and the nation as a whole, there is certainly a disconnect there. Officials are largely tied to the fortunes of their nation, however. As goes America, so also goes George W. Bush. That doesn't mean that his personal gain won't alter US foreign policy in some manner (though that is to be avoided as much as possible) but it can only alter it but so much. Eventually, and ideally very quickly, the interests of the USA and the interests of her President will become the same thing.

      {"commentId":319207,"threadId":"46174","contentId":"382891","authorDomain":"killfile"}
      • 2 votes
      #6.1 - Fri Oct 6, 2006 3:47 PM EDT
      {"commentId":319238,"authorDomain":"chill888"}

      Killfile -

      thanks for patient and thoughtful responses to my questions - I expect u hoped for better questions.

      A slow relaxation of tensions, however, isn't a long term solution - it's a short term on

      I understand the statement .. but sad isn't it?

      Getting to the optimal solution requires trust,

      Yep several thousand years of history suggests this will never happen. Several years ago, some historians postulated the "end of history" implying conflict was ending and we would have one nice big global economy.

      Ironically the risk to the theory was seen in places like China or Africa and certainly not the USA.

      BTW -- i enjoyed the theoretical side to your post and read it carefully. Sorry if my responses are a bit off from your framework. I well understand that the intellectual side to game theory is far more complex than my simple geopolitical comments.

      {"commentId":319238,"threadId":"46174","contentId":"382891","authorDomain":"chill888"}
      • 2 votes
      #6.2 - Fri Oct 6, 2006 4:05 PM EDT
      {"commentId":319288,"authorDomain":"killfile"}

      BTW -- i enjoyed the theoretical side to your post and read it carefully. Sorry if my responses are a bit off from your framework. I well understand that the intellectual side to game theory is far more complex than my simple geopolitical comments.

      I'm glad you enjoyed it, but your responses are great. The intellectual side to game theory, at least as I've expressed it, is actually far more simplistic than your geopolitical comments. Normal Form games assume a single interaction, not the repeated interactions that actually occur in the real world. The result is that, over time, the Prisoner's Dilemma is eventually solved. SALT I and SALT II stand (stood) as testaments to that reality. Eventually we actually got to a point with the Russians that, even though we were enemies, we were willing and able to actually reduce our military capabilities in the interests of peace and stability.

      As to your discussion of the End of History, you might enjoy another article I wrote entitled How Communism Really Works. It's a Techno-Marxian critique of Marxist thought.

      {"commentId":319288,"threadId":"46174","contentId":"382891","authorDomain":"killfile"}
        #6.3 - Fri Oct 6, 2006 4:37 PM EDT
        Reply
        {"commentId":319333,"authorDomain":"chill888"}

        Thanks for link.

        My understanding of PURE communism is that it would actualy work quite well IF and only IF one could ensure that everyone would work at full strength for the common good.

        There seems little doubt (to me) that in a Utopian world where all worked (hard) towards the common good, that everyone would be super rich and prosperous and happy.

        The flaw to the theory is that man is lazy - needs motivation - or man is corrupt - unwilling to share.

        Modern society moderates these weaknesses to a certain degree - through governance. To a relatively high degree in the west and a low degree - in Africa - for example.

        {"commentId":319333,"threadId":"46174","contentId":"382891","authorDomain":"chill888"}
        • 2 votes
        Reply#7 - Fri Oct 6, 2006 5:02 PM EDT
        {"commentId":319402,"authorDomain":"djehuty"}

        Killfile let me bring the concept of repeated iterations of the game into the comment thread here. As Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy says,

        Many of the situations that are alleged to have the structure of the PD, like defense appropriations of military rivals or price setting for duopolistic firms are better modeled by an iterated version of the game in which players play the PD repeatedly, retaining access at each round to the results of all previous rounds. In these iterated PDs (hence forth IPDs) players who defect in one round can be "punished" by defections in subsequent rounds and those who cooperate can be rewarded by cooperation. Thus the appropriate strategy for rationally self-interested players is no longer obvious. The theoretical answer to this question, it turns out, depends strongly on the definition of IPD employed and the knowledge attributed to rational players.

        Whereas a nuclear war may be "one-shot" to some extent it may also not be in many scenarios. Should the US nuke North Korea? That's a single iteration of prisoner's dilemma (let's say) but the US must continue to exist with other "players" (China, Russia, EU) who have seen the outcome of that "game".

        In multiple iterations of PD there are strategies such as "following the opponent's move in the next iteration" which are superior to simply "always defect". These give meaning to the idea of a "reputation" and model real world choices more closely. You won't find it surprising that I'm looking for a logical explanation for "altruism" hehe :)

        {"commentId":319402,"threadId":"46174","contentId":"382891","authorDomain":"djehuty"}
        • 3 votes
        Reply#8 - Fri Oct 6, 2006 6:02 PM EDT
        {"commentId":319553,"authorDomain":"killfile"}

        That does, as you point out, lend a great deal of complexity to the situation. Fortunately, the Chicken game doesn't change much through iteration, where the PD does. Since PD models only the Arms Race rather than war itself, and since defection is the non-optimal Nash Equilibrium, iteration can really only improve the system.

        {"commentId":319553,"threadId":"46174","contentId":"382891","authorDomain":"killfile"}
        • 2 votes
        #8.1 - Fri Oct 6, 2006 9:19 PM EDT
        {"commentId":319690,"authorDomain":"djehuty"}

        :)

        {"commentId":319690,"threadId":"46174","contentId":"382891","authorDomain":"djehuty"}
          #8.2 - Sat Oct 7, 2006 12:39 AM EDT
          Reply
          {"commentId":319829,"authorDomain":"celestina"}

          Great article, Killfile. I am sorry to be so late in commenting, but I really do appreciate the work you are putting into sharing this with everyone.

          Anything that pulls us out of our glut of fear and passion and helps us to view our political situation from a new, logical light is an aid right now (and always). I look forward to the next in the series.

          {"commentId":319829,"threadId":"46174","contentId":"382891","authorDomain":"celestina"}
          • 1 vote
          Reply#9 - Sat Oct 7, 2006 8:32 AM EDT
          {"commentId":320310,"authorDomain":"Sarcophilus"}

          good one killfile

          {"commentId":320310,"threadId":"46174","contentId":"382891","authorDomain":"Sarcophilus"}
            Reply#10 - Sat Oct 7, 2006 8:53 PM EDT
            {"commentId":321389,"authorDomain":"LiberalRebel"}

            I have to say it too, wow! this was a refreshing and at the same time damn brain twisting - thought forcing article that made me both smile, grin ill (because of my own trial to set my self into them situations given) and then, smile again when things came clear. Adored it KillF. Sure as a hammer hitting bullseye on the nail is the fact that I believe any school kid or youth would benefit enormously by having you as a teacher. Thanks!

            {"commentId":321389,"threadId":"46174","contentId":"382891","authorDomain":"LiberalRebel"}
              Reply#11 - Sun Oct 8, 2006 10:15 PM EDT
              {"commentId":326211,"authorDomain":"zaki"}

              and you wonder why a lot of people did not vote this up.

              it's really complex @!$%# you got there! :D

              did not stop me for voting it up though. Although I did have to read it 3 times!

              *clipped*

              ps. WarGames was such an excellent movie. I wish we had more similiar movies nowadays to remind us how we must be careful with our nukes.

              {"commentId":326211,"threadId":"46174","contentId":"382891","authorDomain":"zaki"}
              • 1 vote
              Reply#12 - Thu Oct 12, 2006 6:02 AM EDT
              {"commentId":326277,"authorDomain":"killfile"}

              I'm slogging through the third installment in the series. I was about half way done with it when I realized that everything I was talking about could be tied back to a theory put forth by Dr. Dale C Copeland in a book of his on the origins of major wars.

              So now I'm revamping the entire article to deal with Differential Declining Balance theory. Hopefully it will be a little less numeric than this one.

              {"commentId":326277,"threadId":"46174","contentId":"382891","authorDomain":"killfile"}
              • 1 vote
              #12.1 - Thu Oct 12, 2006 8:16 AM EDT
              Reply
              {"commentId":326524,"authorDomain":"arghawon"}

              I voted for it, but I will have to come back and read it like 5 times....

              Wow Killfile - what a big brain you have?? :)

              {"commentId":326524,"threadId":"46174","contentId":"382891","authorDomain":"arghawon"}
                Reply#13 - Thu Oct 12, 2006 10:55 AM EDT
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