What Are The Iranians Thinking?

Photo by shahram sharif. (License: Creative Commons Attribution)

Since the Iranian nuclear standoff began in earnest, the diplomatic and media exchanges between the United States and the Islamic Republic have been tinged with the unsettling suspicion that war is all but inevitable. Iran's repeated denials of a nuclear weapons program seem to fly in the face of its public announcements of uranium enrichment and its acquisition of huge arrays of gas centrifuges. While Tehran's insistence that it seeks only peaceful and civilian use of nuclear power is certainly plausible, the Iranian government has offered little more than protests to offset its belligerent stance towards the equally bellicose United States.

Tehran is facing off against the most powerful military in the world, perhaps the most powerful in human history. Out-spent, out-gunned, and out-classed, Iran's aggressive stance and hostile overtures against the United States seem the posturings of a madman. Yet basic Realist International Theory holds that Iran's actions are based upon rational decision making and seek the best route to an optimal outcome for the Islamic Republic.

So what are the Iranians thinking?

An Elaborate Bluff

Certainly one option is that of an elaborate bluff. Iran, faced with US forces to its North and West, and repeatedly targeted in US political rhetoric may see a confrontation with the United States as inevitable. Seizing upon the deteriorating situation in Iraq, the Iranian gambit may be to force the situation while the United States is still floundering elsewhere in the world. In such a scenario Iran's seemingly irrational actions become profoundly logical as it is their express purpose to avoid engaging the American military.

In this case, Iran's very public moves against the United States are elegant in their deception. Iranian claims of uranium enrichment and its belligerent rhetoric towards Washington may be seen as a calculated risk intended to sow political dissent within the United States. By manipulating the Bush Administration into making claims and accusations reminiscent of those preceding the increasingly unpopular Iraq war, Ahmadinejad may intend to bluff the American Left into a domestic rejection of Bush's response to the Iranian rhetoric. Simultaneously, Iranian diplomatic efforts undermine support for an potential strike on Iran by threatening economic interests should tension erupt into open war. By consolidating alliances with Venezuela, one of the United States' largest oil producers, Ahmadinejad has effectively communicated the potential economic consequences of a war with Iran. The threat of a Venezuelan oil embargo should serve to keep the business-oriented Republican base suspicious of the wisdom of an attack on Iran and, if Ahmadinejad's gambit succeeds, eliminate political support for a seemingly inevitable war that Iran has little chance of winning.

Pocket Aces

Alternatively, Iran's posturing may indicate more than the bluster of a desperation. Iran is no Iraq. Unlike the regime of Saddam Hussein, Iran has not suffered through a decade of sanctions on the heels of a costly war with the United States. Iran's economy is strong, her geographic position superior to that of Iraq, and her military capability far more developed.

If Iran is not bluffing, the only rational explanation for Ahmadinejad's actions and stance is the expectation of victory. Though still potent, the United States military is a shadow of its Cold War strength. Where American military power persists, Iran is possessed of ample advantages to counter US might. Iran's geography protects her from the American Navy, forcing blue-water ships into the narrow confines of the gulf; and Iran's hardened bunkers and mountainous terrain provide ample coverage and sanctuary from American spy satellites and air-power. If Iran's population can be counted upon the unite in the face of an American attack, even the areal bombardment of Tehran and other Iranian cities may fail to topple the government. In such a case the war will degenerate into a siege or face resolution on the ground.

With US forces tied up in Iraq and backed by the enormous social and religious significance of Iran itself, Ahmadinejad may well believe that a ground war would favor Iran. Certainly the "siege" scenario would play out poorly for the United States. A huge percentage of the world's oil supply passes through Iranian waters daily, and while Iran would suffer under a continuous blockade and air-assault, the economic damage to the United States could prove substantial as well.

The River

The coming months will determine if history will judge Iran's actions to be bluff or belligerence; and the outcome of whatever conflict lies ahead will serve as the ultimate metric for the wisdom of those actions. While the future analysis of what might have been best for Iran or most beneficial for US interests will serve to educate future generations, those that would advise or comment upon the actions and decisions yet to come must do so without the benefit of history's long lens. In assessing the stance, stability, and sanity of the Iranian regime, the American government, like millions of arm-chair pundits around the world and the Iranians themselves, can only judge Iran's options in light of Iranian perceptions and expectations. Thus, while American military planners may consider Iran's defeat a foregone conclusion, it is the Iranian assessment of the crisis that will dictate Ahmadinejad's next move.

What that will be, only time will tell.

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